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CEPS, with financial assistance of the Finnish SITRA Foundation, embarked at the end of
2000 on a programme to examine the impact of Justice and Home Affairs  acquis on an
enlarged European Union, the implications for the candidate countries and for the states with
which they share borders. The aim of this programme is to help establish a better balance
between civil liberties and security in an enlarged Europe.
This project will lead to a series of policy recommendations that will promote cooperation in
EU JHA in the context of an enlarged Europe as well as institutional developments for the
medium- to long-term in areas such as a European Public Prosecutors Office, re-shaping
Europol and a developed system of policing the external frontier (Euro Border Guard). These
must be made within a balanced framework. There are two key issues:
  First of all, to prevent the distortion of the agenda by “events” – some items are being
accelerated and other marginalised. This risks upsetting the balance, carefully crafted by the
Finnish Presidency, between freedom, security and justice. The current ‘threat’ is that security
issues, at the expense of the others, will predominate after the catastrophic events of 11th
September. These have resulted in a formidable political shock, which served as a catalyst to
promote certain initiatives on the political agenda, such as the European arrest warrant, and a
common definition of terrorism. The monitoring of items, which could be marginalised and
the nature of the institutional/political blockages that could distort the Tampere agenda, is our
priority.
  Secondly, how to look beyond the  Tampere agenda, both in terms of providing a flexible
approach during the period of completion of the Tampere programme as well as what should
come afterwards. Much detail remains to be filled in about rigid items on the Tampere agenda
and CEPS will continue to work in three very important areas:
•  Arrangements for managing and policing the external frontier
•  Judicial co-operation leading to the development of a European Public Prosecutor
•  Strengthening of  Europol, particularly in the field of serious trans-frontier violence and
moves towards a more federalised policing capacity
The CEPS-SITRA  programme brings together a multi-disciplinary network of 20 experts
drawn from EU member states, applicant countries as well as  neighbouring states: the
European University Institute in Florence, the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), European
Academy of Law (ERA  Trier), Academy of Sciences (Moscow), London School of
Economics, International Office of Migration (Helsinki), Fondation  Nationale des Sciences
Politiques (CERI) in France, Universities of Budapest, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-
Neuve, University of Lisbon ( Autonoma), University of  Nijmegen, University of Burgos,
CEIFO in Stockholm, University of  Tilberg and University of Vilnius, as well as members
with practical judicial and legislative backgrounds.1
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In order to understand the Italian perspective – or rather the Italian perspectives – on the shift
eastward of EU external borders, it is useful, if not necessary, to anticipate briefly a few
schematic concepts about the meaning of borders in Italian history. This will enable us to
achieve a better understanding of current Italian attitudes in the European debate on border
management issues in the framework of the enlargement process. But a rapid overview on the
recent transformation of the nature and function of borders in the Italian case will also allow
us to draw some tentative lessons for the ongoing enlargement process in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs.
Italy as a Border Country
After having lost its geopolitical centrality with the fall of the Roman Empire, Italy has been
for centuries what we can call a border country. But the meaning of such a suggestive but still
rather vague expression changed deeply across centuries.
While hosting the temporal centre of Christianity, Italy has long been a  cultural border
between Christianity and Islam, with a substantial part of its current territory under Arabic
domination or threat for centuries. Since national unification (1870), Italy has shared borders
with unstable empires or fragmented and weak states to the east and south. More recently, in
the past century, Italy was a crucial sector in the geopolitical border between the West and
the Communist bloc. During the cold war, for example, it was not by chance that Italy was
host to the biggest Communist Party in the West as well as one of the largest US military
contingents stationed outside the United States.
1 During the last decades, and especially since
1989, Italy has served increasingly as a geo-economic border and has consequently been a
target for migratory pressure, both as a destination and as a transit country.
The Schengen Enlargement to Italy
Having been for at least one century an emigration country – probably the largest one in
contemporary world history (in absolute terms) with over 25 million expatriates between 1876
and 1976 (Favero and Tassello, 1978) – Italy, until very recently, lacked appropriate norms,
institutions and infrastructures for the management of immigration. After its sudden, largely
unforeseen metamorphosis from a geopolitical to a socio-economic fault-line, Italy had to
equip itself rapidly with a workable migration management system. This process of institution
building and policy adaptation was put in place under strong external constraints and was
mainly based on the import of external standards, on the compliance with some sort of acquis,
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which was produced elsewhere to respond to different, although in part similar, challenges
and situations.
2
The first Italian law on immigration (1986) was primarily aimed at implementing an
International Labour Organisation convention on equality of rights for “extra-communitarian”
workers. Very soon, however, a quite different type of  acquis gained central ground. The
second comprehensive Italian bill on immigration was actually adopted in 1990, a few months
before the country signed up to the Schengen implementation convention. And the current
immigration legislation entered into force in the spring 1998, on the same day in which Italy
was finally admitted as a full member to the “Schengen club”.
Two lessons can be drawn from the  Schengen enlargement to Italy for the current
(Schengen/EU) enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe:
§  First, there is a positive lesson, namely that, in the Italian case, Schengen acted as a
virtuous external constraint and as a modernising factor (Pastore, 1999). Without that
kind of pressure, the process of adopting modern standards and adequate techniques for
border controls, data protection and police cooperation would have probably been slower
and less effective.
3
§  Second there is also a less positive or at least more controversial lesson to be drawn. The
long de facto transition period (more than seven years) that Italy had to endure before full
operational admission to the “Schengen system” was managed in a rather opaque way,
which produced unnecessary tensions and probably affected the overall effectiveness of
the European internal security regime during that period.
4
Implications for Italy of  the Shift Eastward of the EU External Border
Being “guardians of the gate” has never been a comfortable position. At the present (and still
very limited) stage of development of the post-Tampere common migration policy, the costs
and responsibilities connected with a peripheral location in the Union seem to outweigh the
opportunities, which may also derive from such a condition. The shift eastward of EU
external borders, which will follow enlargement, will partially soften the position of Italy as a
geo-economic border country.Slovenia’s accession, in fact, will imply that, although probably
after a transition period, controls at Italy’s North Eastern land border will probably be lifted
and transferred to the new EU borders with Croatia, Yugoslavia, Romania, or – depending on
the pace and dynamics of enlargement – Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey.
5
The prospect of transferring responsibilities for the controls over a crucial stretch of the future
common EU borders to Slovenian authorities is certainly dominating the minds of some on
the Italian side. As a matter of fact, over the past few years the pressure of illegal immigration
at the border between Slovenia and Italy has increased significantly (from 2,564
undocumented migrants apprehended in 1998, to 6,068 in 1999 and 18,044 in 2000).
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However, the level of bilateral co-operation has increased as well and, in January 2001, an
experiment of joint patrolling of the border was started. The first results seem promising, also
in terms of the estimated residual clandestine flows (Pastore, 2001a).
The Persisting Nature of Italy as a Border Country
But even if and when Italy has no external land border left (apart from the less problematic
Swiss one), and the burden is transferred to Slovenia, Hungary or – as it seems likely and
certainly desirable in the long run – to some EU agency, this will certainly not suffice to
entirely free Italy of its geopolitical destiny as a “border country”. That vast, fluid, non-linear
border that is the Mediterranean will never shift eastward. Italy, just like Spain and Greece,
will never become a “core country”, with all the advantages and the limitations intrinsic to
such a condition.
Remaining a border country, even if only a “blue” border country, will have important
implications for Italy, first of all in the field of migration policy, but more largely in all its
external strategies (also as an actor in the developing common Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Two of those possible
implications are worth pointing out here:
§  First, as a border country, Italy cannot afford to take a purely confrontational attitude
towards non-EU sending and transit countries in the field of migration management. No
country is potentially as much interested as Italy in giving a concrete meaning to
expressions such as “partnership with the countries of origin”, “regional migration
management”, “co-développement”, etc.;
§  Second, Italy can neither afford to face the challenges connected with its border destiny
unilaterally, nor only through a bilateral dialogue with relevant Mediterranean partners.
An effective “ communitarisation” of migration policies, the development of a
comprehensive and sustainable EU Mediterranean policy, the creation of an effective EU
capacity in the field of crisis prevention: all these are primary interests for a border
country like Italy.
Some trends in Italian external policies in the last few years seem to point in the right
direction. One could think, for instance, of the recent, rather innovative, Italian migration
policy, based on an original blend of  cooperative control efforts and active, although
selective, admission schemes (Pastore, 2001b).
6 But mention should be made also of other
Italian initiatives like the Alba Mission in 1997 or the “Adriatic Initiative” revitalised by the
Ancona Conference in May 2000. The forthcoming months will show with what degree of
continuity, consistency and determination the new Italian government will be willing and able
to pursue such objectives, which seem to correspond to fundamental, structural Italian
national interests, but also – at least in the long run – to common European ones.
7
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of Italian migration policy could be strongly affected by the reform, both at the EU level and in the
relations with sending states.ABOUT CEPS
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